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ABSTRACT
We study the influence of job characteristics on prospective retirement as measured by
the probability of working past age 62 or 65. The characteristics fall into three broad classes:
physical and mental requirements, job flexibility including employer accommodation to older
workers, and financial aspects such as pensions and health care insurance. Using data from the
Health and Retirement Survey, we find that physical and mental job requirements have a rather
small influence on prospective retirement, whereas measures of job fledbility and financial
aspects of the job are important determinants.
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Empirical studies of retirement behavior have generally focused on the influence of
financial variables such as pensions, Social Security, wealth and wages. In a broader framework,
however, the decision to retire will involve weighing the utility of leisure against the utility from
working, including the utility from an increase in wealth. From this point of view workers will
retire from unpleasant, difficult jobs at a different rate than from pleasant, easy jobs. Besides
eliminating the estimation problems that will follow if working conditions are correlated with
financial variables, a complete investigation of job characteristics on retirement behavior should
improve our understanding of the retirement process.
An even broader perspective would want to account for the entire choice set facing the
worker. There are many aspects of the choice set. Here we focus on two. The first has to do
with the ability of a worker to vary the volume of work without changing jobs. There is
considerable empirical evidence that workers have little flexibility with respect to hours per day,
days per week or weeks per year (Iturd, 1993). If a worker is constrained to work more or
fewer hours than is desired, he may choose to retire at a different age than in the absence of a
constraint. For example, a worker who wants gradually to reduce hours per week as he ages but
is constrained, may retire earlier than he would were the constraint removed.
A second aspect of the choice set is the availability of alternative other jobs with different
hours and wage combinations. Past studies typically find that an older worker who leaves a
career job will suffer a wage cut of 35%-50% (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1985. Jams, 1987).'
But these studies are based on observations in panel data: we only know the outcomes of those
who remain in the labor force, not those who leave completely. Those who leave completely
perhaps face even less desirable alternatives.
The Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) has a number of questions about job
characteristics of a rather conventional nature. In addition, however, there are questions about
the ability and desire of a worker to vary hours, and a few questions about the prospects of other
employment. In cross-section, these questions would he of liule use in understanding retirement
because they are only asked of workers; however, in the HItS there are several questions about
the prospects of retirement. In particular, workers are asked about retirement plans, including
the expected age of retirement. This measure of the expected age at retirement is quite
1See Hind, 1993, fori discussion of thisliterature.conventional, and has been of limited use in other data sets because the answer is hard to
interpret. Is the response the most likely retirement age, the mathematical expectation, the mode,
or what? However, in addition to this question, the LIRS has innovative questions about the
probability of working past the age of 62 and of 65. These questions show considerable promise,
not just for understanding retirement but other aspects of individual decision making.
This paper has several goals. The first is to analyze the data about job characteristics in
the first wave of the HRS, and to find their variation and correlates. The second is to analyze
the data on other aspects of the job, in particular hours constraints. The last goal is to find the
influence of job characteristics and other variables on the measures of anticipated retirement.
Because of the innovative nature of the probability questions, most of our work will use them;
we will, however, compare the conventional expected retirement age with the probabilities so that
we may understand both better.
2. Previous findings about job characteristics
It is often but not universally found that more physically demanding occupations are
associated with early retirement. In the New Beneficiary Survey, workers in physically
demanding jobs are less likely to work after the initial receipt of Social Security benefits than
other workers (Holden, 1988). In the Retirement History Survey (RHS) (iustman and Steinmeier
(1986) found a smaller proportion of workers in more physically demanding occupations as age
increases, suggesting that such workers leave the labor force at younger ages.
Filer and Petri (1988) argued that job characteristics determine an appropriate retirement
age for a specific job and that the retirement age in turn determines the structure of the pension
program. They found that many job characteristics are significant predictors of early retirement,
Including heavy physical demands and stress. Flexibility of employment, as measured by the
possibility of self-employment or part-time employment, increased the retirement age.
Hayward, Grady, Hardy and Sommers (1989) used factor analysis to derive four job
characteristic groupings; substantive complexity, manipulative skill, physical demands and social
skill. In a hazard model they found that substantive complexity and physical demands are both
significant predictors of retirement: complexity lowers the retirement probability and physical
demands increases it. Other variables such as compulsory retirement, age, health and pension
eligibility operate in the expected direction.
Not all studies have found a relationship between job characteristics and retirement. For
2example, Bartel (1982) used the National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men to compare the
relaLive importance of specific job characteristics in predicting quit probabilities. She found that
repetitive work has little effect on the quit rate of older men. Furthermore, other job
characteristics such as whether the job requires strength, involves bad working conditions, or is
stressful are not significant predictors of the quit probability of older men.
Quinn (1977) examined labor force status as a function of personal and financial
characteristics, labor market characteristics, and job characteristics. Financial characteristics such
as wealth, Social Security and pension eligibility are important predictors of labor force
participation for 58-63 year old men in the RHS. but low autonomy on the job. siress and bad
working conditions are not significant predictors of participation.
Although these studies have mixed results on the magnitude of the influence of job
characteristics on retirement, they have at least established that they should be considered further.
Hours of work restrictions.
If there were no constraints on the choice of hours of work, we would expect that as
workers age and tastes shift toward leisure, they would desire to withdraw gradually from the
labor force. Although there is some shift to part-time work following a separation Irom a lull-
time career job, a substantial majority leave full-time work for full-time leisure (Rust, 1990;
Berkovic and Stern, 1991; Quinn. Burkhauser, and Myers (1990). Among those who reduce
hours, all but a small fraction change jobs, often to another occupation and industry (Ruhm
1990), and earn much less per hour. it is unlikely that workers would make such a change, with
the accompanying income reduction, if their career employer allowed them to reduce hours on
their current job.
The conclusion is that hours constraints are an important aspect of the employment
environment, and that it is likely they help determine the age of retirement.
3. Data
The FIRS is a nationally representative sample of individuals born in the years 193 1-
1941.2 Almost all the interviews were done in 1992, so we wilt refer to 51-61 year-olds as the
2See Thster mu Suaman (1993) for a description of the HRS.
3age-eligible population even though not all were in that age range at the Lime they were
interviewed. The spouse of an age-eligible individual was interviewed, and data from that
interview is included in the HitS data set even if the spouse was not age-eligible. The HRS is
projected to be a panel survey of two-year periodicitythatwill last for at least 10 years.
We use data only onfull-time workers (35hours or more per week) because our main
measure of anticipated retirement in the HRS refers to full-time work after the age of 62. 1 that
there is very little movement from part-time work to full-time work in the age range of the HRS,
we do not wanL our analyses to be influenced by the tastes and perceptions of part-time workers,
For population comparisons, our sample is restricted to the age range 51-61, and we use
sampling weights to account for oversampling of blacks, Hispanics and Floridians. We do not
use weights in regreasiona because we have no reason to believe the regression function varies
with the sampling frequency.3
For analysis we use a sample of men aged 51-61 and women aged 46-61; below the age
ranges the sample sizes are small; people above the age range will not be useful in studying
retirement at age 62 because they are already that age or older. We realize that outside of the
age range 5 1-61, the sample is not representative of the population because a respondent must be
a spouse of an age-eligible person. However, about 23% of the sample is outside the age range
51-61, which is a large fraction to drop in the absence of a compelling reason.4
We include only wage and salary workers because we want to study the effects of
restrictions on hours of work; yet the question about hours restrictions was not asked of the self-
employed. These selection criteria along with several other rather minor selection rules produced
a sample of 3383 full-time wage and salary workers.5
4. Measures of retirement
3tf we thought that the coefficients in a regression function vaned in the population and that the
coeffictenta were systematically different in the eubpopulalion that is oversampled, we would use sampling
weights to yield regression coefficients that are the avenge of the coefficients in the poputation. w5 have no
reason to think that the eoeffleienta vary in such away.Furthermore, ifwe dirt, it woutd be better to
estimate over the subaamplea separately rather than weighting.
4Foranalysiswe often would like to know if a model seems to hold for any population provided the
populatton was not chosen eithertofavor or disfavor the model. Based on this reasoning we imagine that
most analysts will want to use the part of the HR5outsideof the age range 5t-fll.
tWe delete those in the military, and proxy responses, as well as workers who do not receive
compensation in the form of a wage or salary
4In theinitial wave of the MRS we onlyobservejob characteristics andjob-related
financialvariables of those who arestill working,sowecannot study actual retirement.
However, the HRS hasseveral variablesthatmeasureretirement prospectively.Wewilluse
several of these. Our main variablesare responses tothe questions: (On a scale of zero to 10
where0 meansabsolutely no chance and 10 equals absolute certainty).
Thinkingabout work generally andnot just your present job, whatdoyou think
are the chances that you will be working full-time after you reach age 62 (65)?"
We resealed the responses to the interval(0,1]andwewilltreatthem asprobabilities.Generally
wethink ofthem asconditional probabilities, the probabilitiesof working full-timeat 62 or 65
given full-timeworkatage t. Itshouldbe apparent,however,that thequestionisambiguous.It
could refer toanytime afterthe 62nd birthday or itcould refertosometime aftertherespondent
is no longer 62. As we will see,some respondents seem to havehad the first interpretation and
some thesecond.
We call the probabilities P62 and P65. Wewillreferto them as if theywere probabilities
of working, andto 1 —P62 and1 —P65 asprobabilitiesof retiring. Theyare notexactly that, of
course, because they refer to full-time work, not employment.
We want to use these probabilities as variables to be explainedbyjobcharacteristicsand
financialvariables justas if theywere actual retirement probabilities. Before we do that,
however, wewill givesomedescriptivestatistics thatwe hope will increaseconfidencethat they
arepredictive of actual retirement.6
As a wayofvalidating theiruse, wecompare P62and P65 withpopulation averages. We
estimatedthe fraction of the population 55-59 working full-time and the fraction aged 63 working
full-time from estimates of the fraction of full-time workersamongall workers by age, andfrom
labor forceparticipation ratesby age. Accordingtothiscalculation theprobabilityof working
full-timeat age 63conditional onworkingfull-time atages55-59 is 0.457. Theaverageof P62
overthe 55-59year-oldfull-time workers in theMRSis 0.478.
We can makeanadditionalcomparison basedon theMRS databyusing the observations
of62 and 63year-old males who were interviewed but are notinthe age-eligible population.
5SeeUurd and MeGarry (l993a) fori more detailed analysisof theseand other probability vanables in
the HRS.They arehusbands of age-eligible wives, and while they are not exactly representative of the62
and63 year-oldmale population(havingtobe married to younger womentobe in the survey)we
imagine theyare sufficiently representative to give good estimates of the conditional probability
ofworking ftill-time. We estimated the probability ofworkingfull-time at age 62 conditional on
working full-time at Ifromthe fm-Lionof the MRS married males aged62 who areworkingfull-
time andthe fraction ofthe MRS marriedmalesworking full-timeat ages. We estimatedina
similarway the probability of working to age 63 conditional on working at age r.
According to our estimates the average conditional probabilityofworking to 62is072
(averaged over55-61year-olds), and the average conditionalprobabilityof working to 63 is
0.44. Theaverage of P62 over 55-61 marriedmalesis 0.50. Furthermore, at each age from 55
to 61 the average of P62 is bounded by our estimates of the conditional probabilities of working
to62andto 63.
We conclude that the average of P62 is reasonably close to population averages and to
conditional probabilities calculated from the frequencies of full-time work in our sample. This
should increase our confidence that they are good measuresofprospective retirement.
Other measures of anticipated retirement
TheMRS asked workersif they had made plans or thought about retirement, and if so at
what age did they plan to retire completely, change jobs, reduce hours, or become self-employed.
If P62 and P65 are informed probabilities, we expect that they would vary according to whether
someone has thought about retirement.
Table I has the means of P62 and P65 by work plans. Most of these workers (alt 61 or
younger) have not thought about retirement or have no plans (43 percent). Among those who
have thought about retirement, about it percent plan never to stop working. Among the
remainder about 44 percent say they will leave the labor force completely. This is a much
smaller percentage than was observed to retire completely from full-time career jobs in the
Retirement l4istory Survey (RHS), The comparable percentage in the RHS would be about 73
percent.7 If this holds in the MRS panel, it will show a trend to more job switching and hours
reduction following departure from a full-time career-type job than has been observed in the past.
There are large differences in P62 varying from 0.31 to 0,63 as the type of retirement
7Our caleulatiun based on data in Quinn, Burkisauser and Myers, 1990.
6planning varies. It shouldbenoted that the responses of thosewhoplan never to stop working
are not necessarily inconsistent with their averages of P62 and P65. Most who continue to work
after the normal retirement age switch to pan-time work: someone with a definite plan to reduce
hours at age 60, and then work for many more years might answer never stopw and correctly
report zero for P62. since P62 asks about full-time work.
The variation in P65 is even greater than in P62: among those who plan to stop working
altogether the average probability of working hall-time at age 65 is only 0.087.
If a respondent reports that he plans to reduce hours, retire completely, change jobs, or
work for himself, he is asked a follow-up question about the age at which he plans to change his
labor force status, We use these answers to define an expected retirement age (ERET). It is the
age at which someone expects to reduce hours or retire completely. We define ERET in this way
to make comparisons with P62 and P65 which refer to full-time work. ERET is an alternative
measure ofretirementanticipations.
We have 1401 observations on ERET from which we calculated a kind of retirement
hazard rate. It is the number who expect to retire at age t divided by the number who expect to
be working at age t—1. We say that someone who gives ERET =texpects to retire at t, so thaI
the number who expect to work at age t—l is the number working at all ages less than t, minus
the number with ERET less than t. This would be the same as an actual retirement hazard rate if
workers actually do retire at the age given by ERET.
Figure t shows retirement hazard rates calculated in this way over 51 year-olds and over
54 year-olds.' The hazard rate of the 51 yesr-olds has a rather large spike at age 55. A similar
but smaller spike is found in actual hazards in the population. However, we imagine that these
workers have begun to think about retirement at this early age at least partly because they are in
jobs that have incentives to retire at 55. Therefore, more in this group will actually retire at 55
than in the population. The hazards of both St and 54 year-olds have spikes at 62 and 65. but
they are much larger than what is found in panel data such as the RHS.9
Almost none of the workers in their early 50's who have plans for retirement expects to
work past 65 and few past 62. Thus the retirement hazard rates are very large at those ages.
511e hazard rate of workem older than 54 look very similar to the hazard rates of the 54 ycar-olds, so
we do not presentthem.
5There is no obvious explanation for why the hazard of 54 year-olds has no spike at 55: the hard races
of 52 and 53 year-otds have spikesaS 55similar to those of the St year'olda.
7We speculate that this is partlycausedbytheirhaving thought about retirement, meaning they
plan to retire earlier than in the population. It may also be an uninformed response: in their
earlySOs most workers probably give usual orstandard retirement ages. Thus, fewwould have
ERET greater than65, and, indeed, inour sample of 1401, just 26 or 1.8percent haveERET
greater than65.A different kindof explanation isthatERETisthe most probableretirement
age. Few would have a most probable age laterthan65even though substantial numbers could
endup retiring after 65. This shows a weakness of a measure like ERET.
We expect that P62 and P65 will vary systematically with FRET. For example, someone
withFRETless than 62 should have a small value of P62 whereas someone with ERET greater
than 62 should have a large value. Figure 2 shows averages of P62 and P65 by FRET, and they
support our expectation. For example, the average P62 among workers with ERET 56 is just
Ol. The average remains small until at age 61 when it increases from 0.14 to 0.23 and then to
0.67 at age 63. We interpret the increase in two steps (61-62 and 62-63) to be further evidence
thatthe questionabout the probability of working after reaching age 62 is ambiguous. If lhe
questionmeant'after the 62nd birthday,'everyonewith ERET =62 should have P62 1.0. The
rather small value (0.23)leadsus to believethatmost respondents interpreted the questionto
mean workingwhile 62'or 'most of the timewhile62' or possible 'at the 63rdbirthday.'
The factthatP62does not reach 1.0 at ages greater than 63showsthat ERETshould notbe
takento the age of retirement withprobability one.
P65 has a similar pattern withage,and except for age 55 it is alwayslessthan P62.'°
We conclude from this comparison that P62, P65 and ERET show internal consistcncy
and that it is reasonable to consider P62 and P65 to be conditional probabilities of full-time work.
Whether the age is 62 or 63 for P62, or 65 or 66 for P65 is ambiguous.
5. JobCharacteristicsdata in the HRS.
Past research has generally concentrated on physical and mental demandsofthe job.
Therefore, we first study the effects of these kinds of characteristics on prospective retirement.
In section 5.2 we will consider a larger class of job characteristics such as hours constraints.
5.1. Physical and mental job requirements.
15ThelargevalueofP65atage 55 is based on just five observations.
2The HRS asked a number of questions of workers about the characteristics of their jobs.
The questions were meant to measure the physical and mental demands of the job, the
pleasantness of the working environment, and so forth. The questions were in two formats. The
first format is
112. ...'Thinking of yQig job, please telt how often these statements are true. •Choices
are (1) all or almost all of the time, (2) most of the time, (3) some of the time, (4) none
or almost none of the time.
The particular questione we will use are
F82a. '(My job requires) lots of physical effort. (PHYSICAL)
b. ... liftingheavy loads. (LIFTING)
C.... stooping,kneeling, or crouching. (BENDING)
d. ... goodeyesight. (EYES)
e.,, intenseconcentration or attention. (ATTENTtON)
f. ... skillin dealing with other people. (PEOPLE)
g. ... meto work with computers. (COMPUTERS)
h. ... meto analyze data or information. (DATA)
j. ... meto keep up with the pace of others. (PACE)
k. ... meto do the same things over and over. (REPETITtON)
m. ... thatI learn new things. (LEARN)
n. I have a lot of freedom to decide how I do my own work, (FREEDOM)
p. The people I work with are helpful and friendly.' (COWORKERS)
The second format is
F83. 'Here are some more statements that are true for some people's jobs
hut noL for others. Again thinking of your job, this time please indicate how much
you agree or disagree with each statement." Possible answers are (1) strongly
agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree, (4) strongly disagree.
The questions we will use from F83 are
9'b. My job requires me to do more difficult things than it used to. (DIFFICULT)
c. My job requires a very good memory. (MEMORY)
d. My job involves a lot of sutss. (STRESS)
In the first format the questions ask for objective descriptions of the job, not the attitude of the
worker toward the job characteristics. (For example, the worker is not asked if he likes lifting
heavy loads). We would expect, however, that over time workers would sort themselves
according to job characteristics. Thus the objective duty of lifting a 15 pound load might not be
called heavy lifting by someone who does lift 15 pounds, whereas it would be by someone else.
Of course, if the objective is to explain retirement behavior, it is important to understand how the
worker views the job. The self-reported nature of these variables should be kept in mind when
comparing the estimates presented here to those of previous studies.
The questions in the second format seem to be less objective because it would be difficult
to find objective measurements of difficulty and stress. Furthermore, the second format asks for
agreement or disagreement, not whether something happens some of the time or all of the time.
These seems to be no natural scaling of the answers; in particular, without further
investigation we would not want to convert the answers to a scaler. The most important reason
is that many of the behavioral responses to variation in the characteristics are probably not
monotonie. For example, most people would probably prefer some repetition on a job, rather
than doing repetitive work either all or none of the time. Similarly, a good job probably requires
intense concentration some of the time; a boring job requires it none of the time and an overly
difficult job requires t all of the time. Similar arguments can be made about most of the job
characteristics.
The job characteristics define 64 categorical variables. We reduce these to 54by
combining some of the responses with very low frequencies. For example, we combine EYES3
and EYES4 (job requires good eyesight some of the time or none of the time) because the
response rates were 7 percent and 3 percent respectively. Furthermore, we judge that some of
the response categories are not meaningfully different for some of the job characteristics." We
have, therefore, 54 categorical variables for 16 job characteristics, giving us 38 degrees of
freedom after normalization.
"We combine categories I and 2 for LIFtING and categories 3 and 4 for EYES, ATTENTION,
PEOPLE, REPETITION, LEARNING, COWORKERS,MEMORY,STRESS and DIFFICULT.
10Our main focus in this section is the effect of job characteristics on retiremenL. Our
analysis of the last section leads us to concludethatP62 and P65 are good proxies for actual
retirement probabilities; in this section we will use them in place of actual retirement. For our
rIrSL set of results we estimated the linear regression of P62 and P65 on the 38 dummy variables
that define our measures of job characteristics to find if simple data description showed any
patterns.'5 The regression of P62 is significant at the 5% level but not at the 1% level; the
F regressionof P65 is significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 2 has selected coefficients. Our selection criterion for reporting coefficients is to
include all the coefficients from any job characteristic that had at least one categorical variable
for either P62 or P65 significant at the 10 percent level.
The pattern of the signs of the coefficients in the P62 equation is consistent with the
panern of the P65 coefficients, indicating that except for scaling, moat respondents gave similar
responses to the questions about P62 and P65. Although most of the findings are what we would
expect, those about the physical demands of the job are not. The literature suggests that physical
demands are important predictors of early retirement, Yet both PHYSICAL and BENDING had
small, insignificant coefficients (not shown in the table). Only LIFTING has a significant
coefficient, but relative to the literature, it has the wrong sign: LIFTING4 (job never requires
heavy lifting) reduces P62 by 0.054 compared with a job where heavy lifting is required always
or most of time.
P62 and P65 are not monotonic in two of the job characteristics, EYES and STRESS.
Jobs that require moderate use of the eyes and jobs with moderate stress are associated with
higher P62 and P65 than jobs at the extremes. Jobs that require intensive use of the eyes or that
involve a lot of stress are unattractive because of the obvious physical and mental demands. Jobs
that require little use of the eyes or have little stress may be jobs that are boring and
uninteresting.
The other job characteristics have the pattern of signs that we would expect: constant
repetition, no freedom and increased difficulty lead to smaller P62 and P65. Furthermore the
effects are about the same: both for P62 and P65 the difference in the probability between the
first category and the last category is 0.05 for REPETITION, 0.06 for FREEDOM and 0.06 for
DIFFIcuLT.
'Tbisregressionis similar to Filer and Petri (1988). I..ater in this paper we will give revults from
regressiorts that include a number of financial and personal explanatory variables.
itIt is hard LOjudge whether theseare important effects. Fromestimates ofthe conditional
probabilities of working to ages 61, 62 and 63 in the population, we estimate that an increase in
P62 of 0.10 is roughly equivalent to an increase in worklife of one year for someone working at
age 55 (Hurd and McGarry, 1993b). Therefore, we would judge that a change in P62 of 0.05 is
a small to moderate change.
We conclude that although not many of the coefficients are significant even at the 10
percent level (11 out of 76) the ones that are significant for the most part have the expected
signs; the exceptions being the job characteristics associated with physical demands. A final
conclusion is that, in general, the characteristics cannot be reduced to scalers: the probabilities
arc not monotonic in two of the six characteristics.
5.2. Other job characteristics.
In this section we discuss several other kinds of job characteristict The first we roughly
characterize as measures of attitudes toward older workers. Table 3 has the distribution of
responses to two questions that may represent age discrimination. About 17-18 percent agree or
strongly agree with the statements.'3 It is difficult to judge whether this is a large percentage:
perhaps the optimistic way to view the distributions is that 82-83 percent disagree In results
which we do not report here, we found no evidence that these distributions change with age of
the respondent.
The last question shows that most employers will not accommodate a desire fur job
flexibility: about two-thirds of the sample cannot move to less demanding work even with a
wage reduction Yet, in surveys most workers say they would like job flexibility. For example,
many would like to reduce hours gradually as they age rather an retiring abruptly (Jondrow,
Brechling and Marcus, 1987). We imagine this lack of flexibility will induce many to retire.
An additional measure of job flexibility is the ability to vary hours per day, days per
week, or weeks per month. The FIRS asked workers about flexibility as follows 'Could you
increase the number of hours in your regular work schedule?' Those who answered'were
then asked "Would you like to do so if your earnings were increased in the same proportion?'
Notice that the questions are somewhat deficient in that the first question made no reference to a
proportionate increase in earnings. Workers were also asked "Could you re4ntthehours in
latii later work we combine the first two categories because of the low frequency in the first.
12your regular work schedule?t If no" they were asked 1would you like to do so even if your
earnings were reduced in the same proportion?Obviously the aim of the followup questions
was to keep the wage rate constant.
The importance of the question comes from considerable evidence in panel data that few
workers reduce hours on their main, career jobs: most workers leave full-time jobs to retire
completely. Those who do not leave the labor force change jobs to a different occupation andlor
industry,and that the wage rate falls considerably at the change in jobs.'4
Table 4 has the distributions of responses to the hours flexibility questions. Just 12.9
percent have complete flexibility either to increase or decrease hours. A greater percentage can
increase (36 percent) than can decrease (24 percent) but this may be caused by the question's
failure to refer to a change in compensation in response to a change in hours: if respondents
interpreted the question to mean a change in hours with no change in earnings, many might well
think their employers would not bar them from working more, but would prevent them from
working."
Apparently a substantial fraction of workers face hours constraints; yet the constraint is
not binding in the sense that they do not desire to break the constraint. For example, 32.7
percent say they are completely constrained (can neither increase nor decrease hours); yet they
neither want to increase nor want to decrease. An additional 26.4 percent (18.1+ 8.3) are
constrained on one side or the other, but the constraint is not binding. Taken at face value these
high percentages show that people accommodate to their constraints, and after the accommodation
they prefer the new constrained point. For example, if workers form car pools or make child
care arrangements based on their known work schedule, it would be inconvenient to change
hours. They may therefore prefer the complete package of constrained hours and their other
arrangements to a hypothetical change in hours. Fourteen percent cannot reduce hours and the
constraint is binding, and 15 percent cannot increase but would like to.
Table S offers some explanations for these responses. Those with hours flexibility in
either direction work the most hours, have the highest wage rates, the most education and mostly
14Gustesan and Steinmeier (1984,1985), Be&ovic and Stern(1991),Rust (1990), Quinnand
Burkbauser (1990),Hurd (1993), Rubm (1990)and tama(1987).
5Thepercentage that can reduce hours can be compared with the responses in TableSwhere 34
percent agreed that their employers would let them move to a less demanding job. These are, of course, two
dimensions to job tlexibility.The difference in the response rate may well be due to the difference in the
questions: one made reference to a job change whereas the other did not.
13have white collar jobs. Apparently job flexibility is another dimension of a well-paying job.
Those who want to increase hours but are constrained from doing so work fewer hours than those
who do not want to, and they have less household wealth."
Among workers who cannot decrease hours, those who want to decrease hours work
more than those who do not want to: L8 hours more per week, which is a statistically
significant difference. Their other characteristics are similar with the notable exception of
household wealth: it is $84 thousand greater, the highest of any group.'7 Apparently the
constraint is binding both because hours were constrained to be higher, and because a wealth
effect caused desired hours to be lower.
.loh flexibility influences prospective retirement: P62 and P65 vary with hours constraints
as we would expect (Table 6). There is liule difference between those who can increase and
those who can decrease. The interesting differences are among those who are constrained.
Those who want to increase hours have larger values of P62 and P65 and the difference is
statistically significant. Apparently they respond to the hours constraint by working more years.
Those who want to reduce hours but are constrained, have lower probabilities of working than
those who do not want to reduce hours. Again the differences are significant. Especially at age
65, the difference will lead to a considerably lower participation rate, about one-third lower.
6. Determinants of probabilities of working.
In that job characteristics are correlated with other aspects of a job such as pay and
pension availability, we estimated the regression of P62 and P65 on job characteristics and a
much larger set of variables. We made the regression of P62 a linear function of age, the 38
categorical variables relating to the 16 physical and mental job characteristics that we discussed in
section 5.1, a number of other job characteristics and individual characteristics. Because P62 is a
conditional probability, the regression is related to a particular specification of a retirement
hazard function. In particular, we estimate P62 =P(workinghill-time after 62 Iworkingfull-
time at age r;7)which is, in general, a function of a number of job characteristics, financial
variables and other variables, and:. It also depends on T, the tastes of those working at:. The
'6Houaehold wealth includes housing equity and financial wealth, but not pension orSocialSecurity
wealth.
t7Their median wealthis$50 thousand higher, also the highest ofanygroup.
14hazard of leaving hill-time work at 62 given hill-time work at (is just 1—P62. Our particular
functional form makes this hazard linear in age and imposes the restriction that the effect of the
explanatory variables on P62 is independent of age. For example, our functional form says that
the effect on P62 of having a pension is the same for someone of age 51 as someone of age 61
This is a substantial restriction that probably should be relaxed in future work. Similarly the
effects of changes in T as a population ages (and those with greater tastes for leisure retire) can
only enter through age. However, even with a more general functional form we could not
separate in cross-section interactions between age and the explanatory variables from interactions
between taste changes and the explanatory variables.
In addition to age and the 38 categorical variables, our specification for P62 has 13
categorical variables for industry, 16 for occupation, pension and health insurance variables, job
flexibility variables, wage and income variables and personal characteristics including education,
health status, and household wealth. Our strategy is to use hypothesis testing to reduce the
number of right-hand variables. For a time we will concentrate on a discussion of the equation
for P62, and later outline the differences with the equation for P65.
The following table shows the sequence of tests and the outcomes.
Outcomes of tests of hypotheses
Variables Hypothesis OutcomeDecision
16 Occupation All coefficients Failed toDo not consider further
are zero reject
13 Industry All coefficients Reject Include in regressions
are zero
38 job characteristics All coefficients Failed toTest subset of job characteristics
are zero reject interacted with health status
SI interactions between All coefficients Failed toTest subset of principal
job characteristics and are zero reject components
health status
Even though in the final test we could not reject the null hypothesis that all the
coefficients on the categorical job characteristics variables are zero, we considered that physical
job demands might only affect the retirement plans of those in poor or fair health. Therefore, we
interacted PHYSICAL, LIFTING, BENDING, EYES, PACE, REPETITION, and DIFFICULT
15with indicators of self-assessed health status.tt None of the 51 estimated coefficient-s was
statistically significant, and we could not reject the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are
zero.
We next considered that although the job characteristics as a group are not significant,
some combination of a subset may be. That is, the characteristics probably operate together in a
complicated way to produce overall satisfaction from a job: if we knew how to combine them
we might find that a subset does influence P62.
Our method willbeto use the principal components of the job tharacteristics to reduce
the dimensionality of the job description, while retaining their variation. We anticipate that the
characteristics would reduce to just a few principal components that we could interpret. For
example, a principal component for 'plsysicaV would have large coefficients (loadings) on
physical effort, lifting and bending. We would use it (and others) to explain retirement, so as to
be able to see if physically demanding jobs induce retirement.
Using nested hypothesis testing, we tested subsets of the principal components as follows:
Tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on principal
components are zero
principal Degrees of Estimated F- F(5 %)
components freedom statistic
20-38 19 1.25 1.59
11-19 9 0.67 1.88
6-10 5 0.87 2.21
1-5 5 2.75 2.21
We could not reject the first three null hypotheses when taken in the order shown in the table,
We do reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are zero on the largest five principal
components. Our basic specification will therefore include the five largest principal
components.59 We will give a description of the components when we discuss our regression
results below.
The heslth categories were excellent or very good, good, and fair or poor.
The five largest components accounted for 33%ofthe variation in the moment matrix of the job
characteristics.
16The result of the nested hypothesis testing is a regression of P62 on 67 variables. We
estimated the regression over 2938 observations on full-time wage and salary workers aged 46-61
(women) or 51-61 (men). The estimated coefficients are in Table 7, parts A-E.
Part A has the coefficients on a set of variables that we call personal characteristics. The
positive coefficient on age shows that P62 behaves like a conditional probability: it increases by
0.11 over ten years. We interpret the earnings effect to be mostly a wage effect:2° although
there is some variation in hours among these full-time workers, because they all work at least 35
hours a week, most of the variation is in the wage rate. The positive effect could, of course, be
partly due to tastes both for long hours and a longwork-life.The effect is moderate, although
for large changes in earnings (but within the observed data) the would be substantial. For
example,anincome gain of $100 thousand will increase P62 by 0.16, which we estimate to be a
gain in worklife of about one and one-half years. Household income is the combined income of
both the respondent and spouse. We interpret the negative coefficient and the coefficient on
wealth to show that leisure is a normal good. The coefficients on education and self-assessed
health status have the expected signs.
The last two variables are responses to questions about the probability of living to 75 and
to 85. Even holding health status constant we would expect that people who expect to live longer
will want longer worklives to finance more years of retirement. Although the coefficients have
the expected sign they are estimated to be small and they are not significant.2'
Table 7, part B, has the estimate coefficients on financial incentives to work. Although
we have already discussed the effects of earnings it is repeated here for comparison. To model
the complex incentives of defined benefit pension plans (DB) we used responses to questions
about features of the plans: workers with DB plans were asked the earliest age of eligibility for
reduced benefits and the earliest age of eligibility for full benefits! From these responses we
constructed five categorical variables to describe the structure of a plan. D2 is 1 if the age for
early benefits is less than or equal to 62 and the age for full benefits is greater than 62. We
would expect that 1)2 would increase P62 compared with someone who could get full benefits at
ssTbe variable is yearly earnings of the full-time worker.
The rsnge of PUVE7S and PUVE8S is from 0 to t.O. See Hued and MeGarry (1993a) for a
discussion of these variables
We only used information about the pension plan on their current job.
1762 or younger, and possibly even compared with someone with no pension. Thus, a defined
benefit plan does not necessarily increase the retirement probability at all ages; at some ages the
structure of the plan may decrease the probability of retiring. We defined 03 through 06 as
indicated in the table. The reference group among those with Dl) plans has both full and partial
benefits at age 62 or less.
About half of our sample has a Dl) plan on the current job and 62 percent of them say
they arc eligibleforflaIl benefits at 62 or earlier. Early availability of benefits reduces P62
considerably. 0.12 (out of an average of 0.47) compared with a worker who has no pension plan.
If the age for full benefits is greater than 62 (D2 = 1) P62 increases by 0.16. For this group the
net effect of the plan is to increase P62 by —0.12 +0.16 =0.04compared with workers with no
plan. Apparently workers want to remain on the job until they can get full benefits. If early
benefits are not available until after age 62 (03=1), P62 increases by an additional 0.04 so that
P62 is about 0.08 higher than for workers with no pension. If AGEFtJLL or AGE-EARLY is
missing P62 is even higher, but if both are missing, P62 is about the same as among those with
no pension plan: possibly the respondent knows so little about the plan that its features cannot
inform the determination of P62.
The DC eligibility variable comes from a question about the youngest age a worker could
leave the employer and start receiving a monthly pension from the plan.a The estimated results
are qualitatively about the same as with the Dl) plans, but smaller. This is to be expected
because the DC plans do not have the sharp accruals and actuarial adjustments that DB plans
have. Besides a wealth effect, they apparently influence retirement through a liquidity effect:
otherwise, there would be no reason for availability after 62 to affect retirement at 62. In a
similar way a liquidity constraint may be responsible for Social Security causing a retirement
spike at 62.
Having health insurance on the job increases P62, although the effect is not large. Much
larger effects come from having health insurance available to retirees. This is important, of
course, because Medicare is not available until age 65. The effects are monotonic according to
how muth the employer pays for the health insurance. This may represent a pure wealth effect,
hut it probably also reflects some uncertainty about the longer-mn continuation of health
insurance: an employer who pays for the insurance probably has a greater commitment to
keeping the retiree in the employer's risk pool.
nTbia question is asked only if the poision can be received as monthly benefits.
isTable 7, part C, has the coefficients related to jobcharacteristics.Of the principal
components only number 3 has a significant coefficient, and even in that case the effect is small:
the change in component 3 from the 25 percentile to the 75 percentile is 2.41, which increases
P62 by 0.02. The loadings on component 3 show that it is associated with jobs that have some
physical requirements at the level of 'some of the time' or 'most of the time' but not 'all of the
time. •Thejobs are not especially demanding mentally, yet by a measure of mental
requirements that we developed, It has the highest rank of the five largest components. Along
other dimensions component 3 has demands some of the time, and it is at a maximum when
requirements are moderate rather than 'all the time' or 'not at all.'
Principal component 2 has practically no effect even though the loadings show that the
jobs associated with large values of principal component 2 are physically demanding,
Furthermore, it has by far the largest value in our index of physical requirements? The
prediction from other studies in the literature (Holden. 198X) would be that component 2 will
have a strongly positive association with retirement; yet that is not what our results show.
Component 1 is associated with jobs that seem to have few requirements of any kind,
The jobs are not demanding, either physically or mentally; they do not require much alsention
and they are not particularly stressful. Therefore, it would seem that component 1 would not
have much association with retirement. Its negative effect may well be the result of boredom on
the job.
The coefficient on component 4 is almost as large as the coefficient on component 3. and
it is almost significant at the 5 percent level (P=0.066). The loadings on component 4 show
fewer physical demands than component 3, and it has the smallest value in our index of physical
demands, and almost the lowest index of blue collar occupations. This component generally
takes large values when job demands are moderate rather than intense or not at all. If workers
value jobs that are somewhat but not overly challenging, this component should delay retirement.
Component 4 has less variation than 3 (ill from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile), so
its effect on P62 Is smaller than the effect of 3.
The loadings on principal component 5 are small so that we have not attempted an
Interpretation.
In a variation on our basic specification, we added interactions between the five principal
See [turd and MeGarry (1993b), which is an expanded version of this paper, for information about the
pcincipd eomponeats
19components and three categorical health variables (excellent or very good, good, and fair or
poor). The interactions weresignificantat the 5% level (P0.031),mostly due toan interaction
between principalcomponent4 and health of fair or poor. The following table gives the
coefficientson component 4 andstandard errors.
Estimated effectsofprincipalcomponent 4 on £62 by health status
Health status




Our interpretation of component 4 was that it is associated with jobs that are only
moderately demanding. Furthermore, it has by far the lowest score on our index of physical
demands, and, along with component 5, has the lowest index of blue collar jobs. It has
practically no effect on prospective retirement of those with good, very good or excellent health.
Among those in fair or poor health an increase from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile
(2.11) is associated with an increase in P62 of 0.097.
We conclude that moderate job requirements increase the likelthood of working past age
62. In general, physical requirements do not lead to earlier retirement. However, there is some
suggestion that physical job demands interact with health: those in poor health who have jobs
that are not physically demanding have higber probabilities of working pasL 62. Even so,
compared with the effects of DR plans and other aspects of the environment, the effects of job
characteristics are rather small.
A blue collar occupation has practically no effect, and union status, while statistically
significant, is not very large (Table 7, part C). Apparently aspects of jobs that are typically
unionized such as the availability and structure of DR plans cause early retirement, not union
status itaclf.
The next two sets of variables are our measures of age discrimination on the job, and
their coefficients have the expected pattern of signs. For example, if the respondent disagrees
strongly with the statement that younger workers are preferred to older workers in promotion,
20P62 is greater by 0.03. If the respondent disagrees that his co-workers think that older workers
oughttoretirebefore age65, P62 isgreaterby 0.06 (significant at the 5 percent level). This
difference is larger than that associated with a unionized job or a DC pension plan
The next two variables are associated with job flexibility aimed particularly at older
workers: respondents were asked if older workers can move with the same employer to a job
!q thatis Less demanding and pays less. Although the coefficients are not significant, they show that
when they cannot make such ajob change, P62 is lower by 0.02 to 0.04.
The last variables are constructed from a question about whether there is a normal
retirement age for co-workers or for this kind of job. The normalization is on the age range 63
to 65. The effects are large: when the usual retirement age is 62 or less, P62 is 0.19 lower than
when it is 63 to 65. This is about as large as the variation induced by DB plans. in that 40
•
percent of the sample has a usual retirement age of 62 or less, RAGE62 is responsible for
•
reducing the mean of P62 by about 0.076. The other variables have reasonable coefficients:
• when the nonnal retirement age is missing we get a mix of the first category and the
normalization; when it is greater than 65. P62 is increased,
We conclude that the usual physical and mental measures of job characteristics are not
very important in determining anticipate retirement probabilities. Undoubtedly this is partly due
to sorting across jobs and partly to compensations in demanding jobs that make it easier to retire.
For example, DB plans may be structured to allow early retirement in physically demanding jobs.
However, there are physically demanding jobs that do not have pensions, so we would expect to
find some effect anyway. We do not.
There is modest evidence that an employer who allows older workers to change to an
easier job will retain them as shown by the coefficients on O_DEMT3 and O_DEMT4. By far
the most important effect in the table is related to usual retirement age. Of course, usual
• retirement age is not static either over time or aãoss jobs, and it is probably partly caused by job
requirements. To the extent that we have included those job requirements, however, the results
show the importance of convention in decision making.
We presented in Table 6 the cross-tabulations of P62 by our measure of hours flexibility.
Table 7, part D, has comparable results from the regression, and therefore, takes into account job
and personal variables that may be correlated with hours restrictions. Generally the effects are
attenuated. For example, in Table 6 the difference in P62 between those who can increase hours
and those who cannot but do not want to is 0.07. In Table 7, part 0, the difference is 0.048
(HRSUPOK). But even that difference disappears with age: by age 60 there is practically none.
21Among those who cannot Increase hours, P62isgreater by 0.077 when the constraintisbinding
(HRSUP).Ourinterpretation is that these workers will substitute for the binding hours constraint
by working more years. The differencefallswith age so that byage60itis just 0.026.This
reduction may reflect the fact thatthe constraint, whilestill binding, becomeslessimportant with
age as tastes shifttoward leisure.
Amongthose who cannot reduce hours,themost interestingcomparisonis between thosc
whowantto reduce hoursandthose who do not want to. When theconstraint is binding, P62 is
lower by0.06 (HRSDWN), That is, those who must work more hours thanthey would like to
anticipateretiringbyage62with a greater probability. We sawin Table 5 thai people in these
jobs work more hours and have greater wealth; but the estimatedeffect ofthe hoursconstraint is
greater than of the wealth effect. The difference in wealth is $84 thu uand, which, according to
our estimates in Table 7, part A, reduces P62byabout 0.01 whereas the constraint reduces it by
0.06.
Thefinal two variables in Table 7, part D, are also related to the choice set broadly
speaking. The first is the subjective probability the respondent will lose his or her job during the
year. An interpretation of the negative coefficient is that P62 takes into account a number of
contingencies: for example, someone who is certain to be laid off would have low probabilities
of P62 because most who are laid off during their 50's eventually retire rather than take another
job, On the other side, if the respondent thinks the probability of finding another job is high,
P62 will be increased. In that PFINDJOB varies from zero to one, the predicted change in P62
can be as large as 0.08.
Table 7, part E, has the coefficients on the categorical variables representing the industry
of the job. We will not discuss them as they are not the focus of this paper, but we note that
there are some rather large differences: 0.12 between public administration and retail.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate systematically the joint retirement
decision of husbands and wives. Nonetheless, to check the robustness of our results we added to
an asixiliary regression a number of variables that prior research has shown to influence the
retirement decision of a spouse!5 They included the spouse's employment status, the spouse's
probability of working past 62, and the difference in the ages of the husband and wife. Although
these variables themselves influence P62, their inclusion had practically no effect on any of the
estimated coefficients on job characteristics, including pensions, health insurance, hours
25See Foul, 1990.
22; restrictions and so forth. We concluded that for the goal of this paper we did not need to
investigate further the joint retirement decision of husbands and wives.
The rather odd structure of DB plans has led to the idea that they were designed to allow
workers to leave physicallydemandingjobs at about the age when the jobs became too
demanding.ifthat were the case, the coefficients on job characteristics shouldberather srnafl
when theDBvariables are includedintheP62equation because the structure of the DR plan
would adequately account for variation inP62.Conversely, if the DR plan variables are
excluded,the coefficientson job characteristics shouldbecomelarge. However, inestimatesnot
shown,thereis almost no change in the coefficients on the five principal components when we
•
leave the DO variables out of the P62 equation,
We repeated all the calculations we have been discussing but using P65 as the left-hand
variable. However, our hypothesis testing strategy led to a different outcome. With respect to
P65 we could not reject the null hypothesis that all the coefficients on the occupation variables
are zero nor the null hypothesis that all the coefficients on the industry variables are zero. When
we imposed these restrictions and tested the coefficients on the 19 smallest principal components
we rejected the null hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero. Therefore we were
left with a different model. In the results we report, P65 depends on all 38 principal components
(which is the same as dependance on all the job characteristics), but not on the industry or
occupation variables. We also excluded the variables that differentiate the ages for full and
partial benefits under DR and DC plans since almost everyone has both full and partial
availability at 65 or earlier. Any variation in the age for benefit qualification should have no
effect on P65 as long as the age is 65 or less. We will not describe the results in the same detail
we did with P62 because there are far fewer large or significant estimated coefficients. Rather
we will discuss novel or important findings.
The earnings and wealth effects are significant and similar to those for P62. The
coefficient on PL1VE85 is estimated to be 0.10 (with standard error of 0.03). This is a rather
• large fraction of the average of P65 (0.23). Because the health variables are included and have
•
the expected signs, this is evidence that those with greater life expectancy plan longer worklives.
As discussed above, in our main results we excluded D2 through D6 and DCAGEE
because they should not matter for P65. To satisfy ourselves that they do not matter, and,
incidentally, to provide additional evidence that their operation in the P62 equation comes from
the structure of the DOplansand not from some unexplained correlation with other job or
personal characteristics, we temporarily added them back into the P65 equation. Table 8 has the
23coefficients from that regression and for purposes of comparison the corresponding coefficients
from the regression of P62.
Thefirst line shows the effects of having a DR plan with full benefits available at 62 or
younger compared with not having a DR plan. Both P62 and P65 are considerably smaller. The
interesting comparison is in lines 2 and 3. When full benefits are available after age 62, P62
increases by 0.16, but P65 is almost not affected. (Almost all can get full benefits at 65 or
younger.) This is good evidence that the respondents know the details of the pension plans and
adjust their subjective probabilities to take account of the plans. When partial benefits are
available only after age 62, P62 increases by 0.20 compared with the base ease- P65 also
increases. This may be due to the ambiguity of the questions on the probabilities of working:
someone who plans to retire while 65 because DR benefits are not available until age 65 •may
give a high value of P65, In any event the coefficient in the P65 equation is substantially smaller
than in the P62 equation.
The effects of the availability of health insurance on P65 are smaller than on P62 (Table
9). This should be expected because of the availability of Medicare at 65. Health insurance on
the job increases P65 by 0.054 which just balances having fully paid retiree health insurance: in
that it is available whether working or not, it should not influence the retirement choice.
Among the job characteristics only four of the 32 are significant at the 5%level,and
none of the physical characteristics is significant. The only coefficient that is substantially
different from the corresponding coefficient in the P62 equations is that on freedom in work
decisions. This is consistent with some findings in the literature: according to surveys of
managers the main negative characteristic of older workers is that they become rigid (Hurd,
1993).
As was the case in the P62 equation, the usual retirement age among co-workers or on
the job had a large effect (Table 10). What is particularly interesting is the difference in the
coefficients between the two equations. As discussed earlier a usual retirement age of 62 or less
has a large effect on P62 but it has little effect if it is greater than 65. In the P65 equation,
however, the difference between jobs with a usual retirement age of 62 or less and those with a
usual retirement age of 63-65 should be small, although probably not zero because of the
ambiguity in the question about P65. Finally, P65 should be much higher in jobs in which the
usual retirement age is greaser than 65.
These patterns are exactly what is found in Table 10. The effects are large: the variation
in P65 is 0.32 a.c the normal retirement age varies from 62 or less to 66 or over. This variation
24is larger than the mean of P65.
The effects of having flexibility in the choice of hours of work are similar in the P65
equation to the effects in the P62 equation. Table 20 includes the coefficients from the P62
equation for comparison, and it shows the results from evaluating the age-interactions terms.26
As before, those who would like to increase hours plan to work more years, but the effect is
smaller than in the P62 equation. Those who would like to reduce hours give lower probabilities
of working past 65, and the effect increases with age. This is compatible with the idea that as
workers age, what was a good job match at a younger age becomes increasingly a bad match.
and their response in the face of hours rigidity is to retire. By age 60 the difference (0.063) is a
large fraction of the mean (0.228).
A result not shown in the cable is that someone who is optimistic about finding a job
should he or she be laid off (PFINDJOB) reports higher values of P65, about 0.07 higher
(significant).
6. Conclusion
We have studied the influence of a number of job characteristics on the probability of
working past 62 or 65. The physicaJ or mental demands of the job seem to have only a modest
influence on prospective retirement. We imagine this happens because of interactions between
the actual job demands and personal capabilities. People choose jobs that are in consonance with
their abilities. Thus, a job that objectively requires lifting will attract workers capable of lifting,
and that job requirement will not necessarily lead to labor force withdrawal. If capabilities
change with age, mismatches will develop between job requirements and capabilities. But if the
change in capabilities is even, job characteristics will not appear to influence retirement: the
uniformly increasing mismatch between capabilities and jobs will just appear as an increase in the
baseline retirement hazard rate as people age.
If capabilities change differentially with age, job characteristics can have an observable
influence on retirement. For example, if all workers lose their physical capabilities sooner than
their mental capabilities, a mismatch will develop between workers in physically demanding jobs,
even though there was no mismatch earlier in the work career. Then, workers in physically
demanding jobs will tend to retire earlier, Similarly, if some workers fall into (physically) worse
2& ige effects on increasing hours ire very emalt, ao we do not show them.
25health, they willtendto retire earlier if they work in physically demanding jobs. We found some
modest evidence for such an effect among those In fair or poor health: the principal component
that is associated with the least physically demanding jobs is associated with a longer workllfe.
Our results Indicate that a number of seemingly negative job characteristics are at an
optimum when they are moderate. For example, having some stress on the job seems to be
better than never having stress or always having stress. Of course, this could be due to
correlations between the job characteristic and other unmeasured job attributes.It could also be
due to a human desire not to be bored. Whatever the explanation, the results imply that often a
set of categorical job characteristic variables cannot be reduced to a scaler.
Even though the physical and mental job characteristics are not important determinants of
P62 and P65, other nonfinancial aspects of the job are Important. For example, if the usual
retirement age in a particular type of work is less than or equal to 62. P65 is predicted to be 0.12
by our regression; yet if the usual retirement age is greater than 65, P65 is predicted to be 0.44.
This change is even greater than changes associated with changing the stricture of DB pension
ptans.
The ability to change hours of work or so move to a less demanding job with the same
employer increase the prospective retirement age. This is in accord with the stated desire of
workers to reduce work effort gradually, rather than moving from 6.111-time work to complete
retirement (Jondrow, Brechling and Marcus, 1987).
Pensions have a strong influence on prospective retirement, which agrees with previous
findings about the relationship between pensions and actual retirement. A more novel finding is
the effect of the availability of health insurance, both for employees and for retirees. Work-
related health insurance is, of course, a financial reward from working, but it is also a job
characteristic: it provides access to a risk pool; iL reduces or even eliminates the importance of
prior conditions; and it eliminates the risk of losing Insurance following large medical expenses.
It is difficult, if not impossible, for an individual to purchase these characteristics.
Its summary, we found that job characteristics are important determinants of prospective
retirement, but not those which have been traditionally studied such as physical requirements.
Taken as a whole, however, they do show the importance of nonmonetary aspects of the work
environment on the labor force behavior of older workers. We base this conclusion on the
relationship between job characteristics and prospective retirement which, of course, leaves open
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45 so 70 do do
Expected retirement age
Probabiflty 62 -*— Probability 65Table 1





Stop altogether 24.3 .311 .087
Never stop 6.0 .627 .437
Not thought, no plan 43.4 .555 .293
Work fewer hours 18.2 .441 .214
Change kind, work for self 12.7 .420 .188
All 104.&
Source: Authors' calculations from HRS.
.468 .227
More than 100% because multiple answers given.Table 2
Probability of working after age 62 or 65: Effects of job characteristics
Job characteristic After 62 After 65 Explanation
LIFTING
1,2 - - all ormost
3 -0.018 0.010 some
4 M054t -0.006 none
EYES
1 -0.032 -0.032' all
2 - - most
3,4 -0.012 some or none
REPETITION
I o.ol9t -0.04C all
2 - - most
34 0033t 0.007 some or none
FREEDOM
I O.O3P 0.062' all
2 - - most
3 -0.005 0.018 some
4 -0.033 -0.009 none
DIFFICULTt
1 -0.017 -0.014 strongly agree
2 - agree
3,4 0.039 0.051 disagree
STRESS
-0.027 -0.012 strongly agree
2 - - agree
3,4 -0.039' -0.017 disagree
Source: Authors' calculations from HRS.
Note:Significant at 5% level. tsjgnificarit at 10% level.
tlob requires more difficult things than it used toTable 3
Distributionof responses(percent):





P85c; In decisions about 3325 4 14 67






F85d: My co-workers make 3336 3 14 66
olderworkersfeet that they
oughtto retirebefore age 65
18
F85e: My employer would 3276 3 31 55
letolderworkers move toa
lessdemanding jobwith less
pay if they wanted to
12
Source: Authors' calculations from HRS.
Table 4
Distribution of Workers: Hours Flexibility (percent)
Can you increase hours?
Can you decrease Yes No, don't want toNo. want to
hours?
All
Yes 12.9 8.3 2.8 24.1
No, don't want to 18.1 32.7 11.5 62.3
No, want to 5.0 7.9 0.8 13.6
All 36.0 48.9 15.1 100,0
Source: Authors' calculations from HRS.Table S














Can increase hours 45.3 14.45 34.2 13,1 24 2.33
Cannot increase hOiiI
42.3 12.69 28.0 12.8 28 1.98 Do not wantto
Want to 40.6 10.97 23.2 11.8 42 1.19
Cart decrease hQun 45.2 13.52 31.9 13.0 19 2.36
Cannot decrease hours
Do not want to 42.1 13.11 28.8 12.6 32 1.72
Want to 43.9 12.68 28.9 12.8 29 2.56
Source: Authors' calculations fromFIRS.Table 6
Average Probability of Working Full-time: Hours Flexibility
Hours constraint After age 62 After age 65
Can increase hours 0.50 0.26
Can netincrease hours
Do not want to 0.43 0.20





Do not want to 0.48 0.23
Want to 0.37 0.15
(Difference) 0.11 0.05
(0.02) (0.01)
Source: Authors' calculations from HRS.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.Table 7, Part A
Probability of working past 62: personal characteristics
Variable Coefficient Standard err. Explanation
AGE 0.0109' 0.0029 Age-SO
EARNINGS O.0016 0.0004 individ earnings (1k)
INC}{H -0.0012' 0.0003 household income(1k)
WEALTH -0.0106' 0.0026 household wealth (100k)
WHITE 0.0434 0.0172 1 if white
SEX 0.0398' 0.0161 1 if male
NSSEXP 0.0389 0.0271 expects Soc. Sec. income
EDUC1 0.0038 0.0193 Less than ES,
EDUC3 0.0483' 0.0162 More than RS.
HLTH2 -0.0165 0.0170 health very good
HLTH3 -0.0482' 0.0182 health good
HLTH4 -0.0666' 0.0262 health fair
HLTH5 0.0003 0.0513 health poor
PLIVE75 0.0383 0.0350 probability liveto 75
PLIVE8S 0.0467 0.03 10 probability live to 55
(coefficients continuedin Part B)
Source: Authors' calculations fromthe MRS.
Note: Mean of P62=0.47.
Note: Significant at 5% level.Table 7, Part B
Probability of working past 62 Financial Incenlives
(coefficients continued in Part C)
(continued from Part A)
Variable CoefficientStandard err.Explanation
EARNINGS 0.0016' 0.0004 kdiv Earnings (1k) (sect N)
DII -0.1181' 0.0199 1 if defined benefit
D2 (DB) 0.1637 0.0235 1 if agefull>62 & age-early ￿62
D3 (DB) 0.199W 0.0363 1 if agefull>62 & age-early >62
D4 (DII) 0.2474 0.0666 1 if agefull>62 & age-early
D5 (DII) 0.2197 0.0576 1 if agefull= & age-early ￿62
D6 (DII) 0.1048' 0.0472 1 if agefull= & age-early =
DC -0.0533' 0.0235 1 if defined contribution
DC_AGEE 0.0739 0.0496 1 if do & age-early >62
DC_AGEEM 0.0357 0M27l 1 if dc & age-early =
HEATHINS 0.0324 0.0273 1 if health ins, on job
DHEALT}f 1 -0.0270 0.0195 1 if retiree hlthins avail, not paid
DHEALTH2 -00843' 0.0209 1 if retiree hlthins avail, some paid
DI{EALTH3 -0.1132' 0.0243 1 if retiree hithins avail, alt paid
DHEALTH6 -0.0024 0.0230 1 if retiree hlthins
Source: Authors' calculations from the HItS.
Note: agefull =earliestage for full benefits under DII plan; age-early =earliestage for any benefits under DII or DC plan.means the datum is missing.
Note: 'Significant at 5%level.Table 7, Part C
Probability of working past 62: Job characteristics
Variable CoefficientStandarderr.Explanation
(continued from Part B)
PRINI -0.0050 0.0033 principle component 1
PR1N2 0.0008 0.0037 principle component 2
PR1143 0.0085 0.0039 principle component 3
PRIN4 0.0080 0.0043 principle component 4
PlUMS -0.0072 0.0044 principle component 5
BLUEC 0.0101 0.0207 blue collar occupation
UNION -0.0450 0.0t65 union job
O_PRMT3 0.0066 0.0187 F85C: younger preferred: disagree
O_PRMT4 0.0348 0.0269 younger preferred: strongly disagree
O_RET3 0.0641 0.0196 F85D: older ought to retire: disagree
ORET4 0.05S0 0.0270 older ought to retire; strong'y disagree
ODEMT3 -0.02 14 0.0148 F8SE: can move to less demanding job: disagree
O_DEMT4 -0.0419 0.0242 can move to less demanding job: strongly disagree
R_AGE62 -0. 1889 0.0159 P90: usual retirement age on this job <=62
R_AGE66 0.0717 0.0507 usual retirement age on this job > =66
M_R_AGE -0.0662 0.0514 usual retirement age on this job =
(coefficientscontinued in Part U)
Source: Authors calculations from the FIRS.
Note:Significant at 5%level.Table 7, Part ID
Probability of working past 62: hours restrictions
Variable Coefficient Standard err.Explanation
(continual from Part C)
HRSUPOK 0.0483' 0.0240 Could increase hrs: 1 =ycs
A_UPOK -0.0039 0.0040 AGE*HRSIJPOK
HRSUP 0.0768 0.0326 Would you like to increase; 1 =yes
AGE_UP -0.0052 0.0055 AGE9{RSEJP
HIRSDWNOK 0.003 1 0.0264 Could you reduce hrs: 1 =yes
A_DWNOK -0.0021 0.0044 AGET{RSDWNOK
HRSDWN -0.0600 0.0320 Would you like to reduce: l=yes
AGE_DWN 0.0002 0.0053 AGEtHRSDWN
PLAYOFF -0.0357 0.0274 Prob. lose job during year
PFINDJOB 0.0817 0.0 187 Prob. find new job
(coefficients continuedin Part E)
Source: Authors' calculations fromthe HRS.
Note: Signiftcant at 5% level.Table 7, Part E
Probability of working past 62: Industry
Variable CoefficientStandard err. Explanation
(continued from Part D)
IND 1 -0.0189 0.0594 Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing
IND2 -0.0002 0.0346 Mining and Construction
IND3 -0.0152 0.0273 Manuf: Non-durable
INnS -0.0585 0.0291 Transportation
IND6 0.0 168 0.0374 Wholesale
[ND7 -0.0759' 0,0309 Retail
11ND8 -0.0712 0.0328 FIRE
IND9 -0.0099 0.0396 Business/Repair Serv
IND1O -0.0713 0.0483 Personal Services
IND11 -0.0364 0.0582 Entertainment/Rec
INDI2 -0.0109 0.0246 Professional Scrviccs
IND13 0.0556 0.0329 Public Aclmin
Source:Authors calculations from the HRS.
Note:Industry 4, durable manufacturing, is reference.
Note:Sign.ificant at 5% level.
Note:R'=0.22Table 8
Defined Benefit Plans: Comparison of Effects on P62 and P65
Structure of DB plan
Distribution of
Coefficientson
Youngest age forYoungest age P62 P65
reduced benefitsfor full benefits respondents
less than 63 less than 63 0.62 -.12 -.10'
less than 63 greater than 62 0.21 0.16' 0.04
greater than 62 greater than 62 0.07 0.20' 0.08
(missing) greater than 62 0-02 0.25' 020'
less than 63 (missing) 0.03 0.22' 0.08
(missing) (missing) 0.04 0.10' 0.14'
Source: Authors'calculations from theHRS.
Note:Significant at 5% level.
Table 9
Effects of availability of health insurance on P62 and P65
Structure of health insurance P62 P65
Health insurance on job 0.032 0.054'
Retiree insurance available
Notpaid -.026 -.001
Partially paid -.084' -.053'
Fully paid -.113' -.055'
Availability missing -.002 0.040'
Source: Authors' calculations from HRS.
Note: 'Significant at 5% level.table 10
Effect of tfsuai Retirement Age on Probability of Working Past Age 62 or 65
Usual retirement age 62 65
Lessthanorequai to62 -.19' -.tr
Greater than 62 and less than66 - -
Greater than 65 -.07 0.21'
(missing) -.07 0.01
Source: Authors' calculations
Note; Significant at 5% level.
from HRS,
Hours flexibility 62 65
Cannot increasehours
Don't wantto -
Want to 0.078' 0.045
Cannot decreasehours
Don't want to - -
Want to - -
Age=50
Age=60
Source: Authors' calculations from HRS.
Note: 'Significant at 5% level.
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